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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
STRUCTURAL STEEL & FORGE CO., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8785 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Believing appellant's statement of facts to be inade-
quate, we present to the Court our own statement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent,_ Union Pacific Railroad CQmp~ny, com-
menced four seJ>J!!'~~t~ act19ns against appellant in the Third 
J uqj~i~l~P.i~t.r.i.~t (J_<>urt_ qf.th~ State of l]tap., in ~nd for Salt 
La.~e _Qounty, to recover undercharges on shipments of iron 
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and steel yro.Q_t.t~ts. The four complaints contain 104 causes 
of action, and the damages sought by the Railroad amount 
to approximately $50,000. Appellant ~enies that Union 
P~Gif.i~ _.51t entitled to . the ~uruier.charg.es an.d....alleges.,._futer 
alia, thatit,h.as_p~i d . all .of._ the .freight.Ja.wf11l J Y.~du.eJ.>.IL.ea.c.h 
cause of action .. 
At all times involved appellant was in the business 
of fabrication and manufacture of various iron and steel 
products. Respondent alleges that during the period be-
tween July 1, 1953 and August 1, 1955, appellant made 
numerous shipments of iron and steel articles from Salt 
Lake City, Utah, to various destinations. On each of these 
shipments appellant claimed the benefit of a through rate 
from point of origin, which had been outside the State of 
Utah, to the point of final destination, under the provisions 
of respondent's f~ricatiQn:in:tr~nsit tariff .. 
The tariff is UP 7188-P, effective May 15, 1952, en-
titled "Rules and Charges Governing Fabrication and Treat-
ing of Structural Iron or Steel in Transit at Stations in 
* * * Utah * * * on U. P. R. R., as Defined in 
Item No. 5."* l~.Pul:Uished and maintained b~ respan-
d~nt . to~gi.ye_ ,ellin:ger§ the be.nef.its _  of.J.L_through rate from 
origin. to ulthnate J!g§ii.Jl~~JQJt on carlg_~~t shipments of iron 
a..nd .. steeL articles which a.re s.tOillled .in the ... cuurse of .tr.aU§it 
at_ variQ~J~_ .. §~tJQJl§ .. .. QI.t the U:gion Pacific Railroad ,.{Qt..the 
purpose of rewor~ing_Qr_jabrt~atj_~g. The tariff requires, 
among other things, the surrender of the inbound transit 
billing representative of the material actually used in fab-
*For material excerpts from this tariff and its supplements applicable 
to the issues in these cases, see Appendix. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
rication or reworking the outbound commodity. To be 
eligible for the through transit rate the shipper is subjected 
to the rules and conditions of the transit tariff.** 
The causes of action in the four lawsuits involve in-
stances where appellant has shipped iron or steel products 
from its headquarters at Salt Lake City, Utah, to various 
points of destination, upon which it paid freight charges 
based upon the through transit rate from point of origin to 
final destination, claiming the fabrication-in-transit privi-
lege set forth in 7188-P and applicable supplements. Re-
spondent claims that appellant misconstrued the applica-
tion of the transit privilege and that it does not apply, 
contending therefore that freight charges should be as-
sessed on the shipments from Salt Lake City, Utah, to 
points of destination as separate movements. 
The issue, then, is whether the tariffs asserted by 
Union Pacific and listed in the record in its answers to 
**Transit is the right of a shipper to stop a carload shipment at an 
intermediate point and change the form or substance of the commodity 
shipped and afterwards reship the commodity to the point of final des-
tination at a totaL_chaJ:'..,g:_~ for.Jra~nsp9.r.tation.J..lllt..~x~~~djnK . .:tM1 w_hi~h 
wnul d haye. b~ appU~~Li;tJh~cJlanged .,e.Qmm.9.ditx...JJ&g. J?.g~Jl_ shipped 
~Prigi;rt.J.P.,.fin.~J ... destination yvjthout_ h~ing stopped_Jn. 
transit. The privilege of transit is a departure from the usual and 
ordinary transportation service of a carrier. Under it, shippers are 
afforded more favorable rates than would obtain if the inbound and 
outbound movement to transit points were treated as separate ship-
. ments. It is actl]J!.llx.,Jl!~, stopping 9;( a commo~]jty fo~. process or Q~her 
purJ)~..s_u..nder an a;rx:angeme.nt which." by . a" .fiction ti~s the_ in:Qq-qnd 
and outh2!!JML!!tovement tqg_e.,tper §JLa.~,.Jo .. ~reate.~. in J.~_w, J!-~Q.ntin!!9.ll.l?,. 
through movemgnt_..a»Jl. lJ.Qtj;_wo. separ.ate movements. Propriety of 
Operating Practices-New York Warehousing, 216 I. C. C. 291, at 349 
(1936); Transit on Cotton Seed at Quanah, Texas, 232 I. C. C. 183, at 
188 (1939) ; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 263 I. C. C. 
503, at 509 ( 1945). 
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4 
interrogatories to each cause of action, should determine 
the rates to be applied to the shipments or whether the 
through rate based upon the privilege granted by 7188-P 
should control. This, in turn, depends upon the construction 
and interpretation given to the various Items of the transit 
tariff. 
An examination of the pleadings and discovery in the 
record reveals that most of the causes of action are based 
upon three standard fact situations: 
( 1) In a majority of the causes of action the inbound 
shipment contains a product which is one of those listed 
in Item 5 of the tariff. The outbound shipment is a mixed 
carload containing .-&Une...xe.w_or.ked m.at__ecial... but tbe_unre-
worked products is another article listed in _Item 5. An 
example of this situation may be found in the sixth cause 
of action in Case No. 106336. This raises the question of 
the proper meaning of the various words and phrases in 
Item 5 and Item 125 as to whether the outbound unfabri-
cated transit articles in a mixed shipment is transit material 
entitling the transit operator to the balance of the through 
rate. The problem is contained in the order of referral to 
the Interstate Commerce Commission as Question No. 1. 
(2) A majority of the causes of action also involve 
the situation where the inbound shipment consists of one of 
the· articles listed in Item 5 as transit material, and the out-
bound shipment, or a part thereof, c.onsists of a different 
product but also listed as transit material in Item 5. The 
outbound shipment consists merely of the second transit 
item, which has been reworked or fabricated. This situa: 
tion and its variations bring into issue the meanin<T and ~---· .. ---- ~--,----··--- -·------.. -·--,~~--~,- - .. , .... " ............. ' 0 _ .. _ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
CQit~ruct~Qn of the WQrds and phrases ~of_ Item_100 of the 
tarif.f~~~,J;o wh~th~r.tr~nsitjs. __ proper on outbound reworked 
co~mo~ities _w.h!~_h, __ a,._~~- _;t:I.2t .. rep~es_~l1tative of_ the inbound 
pro<!_uct. An example involving this issue also may be 
found in the sixth cause of action in Case No. 106336. The 
referral order to the Interstate Commerce Commission pre-
sents this issue as Question No. 3. 
(3) A number of the causes of action involve the sit-
uation where the inbound shipment of transit material is 
unloaded at a non-transit warehouse and the outbound 
shipment, which comes from appellant's warehouse, is sup-
ported by a freight bill or credit slip represented by the 
inbound shipment unloaded at the nontransit warehouse. 
An example involving these facts may be found in the 
sixty-seventh cause of action of Case No. 106671. The issue 
involves the proper con§tt!l~l!Q:tl -~-n.<l interpretation of Items 
80 and 120 of the tariff. The referral order to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission presents this issue as Question 
No.4. 
A lesser number of the cases involve two additional 
fact situations: The first is whether the transit balance 
is applicable on outbound carloads after storage at the 
transit station, where no fabrication or reworking took 
place at the transit station. An example of this situation 
may be found in the fifty-second cause of action of Case 
No. 106671. The referral order to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission presents this issue as Question No. 2. The sec-
ond situation is where transit credits covering inbound 
shipments of steel sheets are asserted as a basis for claiming 
transit balance rates on outbound shipments of coated and 
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wrapped pipe. There is no express language in the tariff 
providing for coating and wrapping of pipe fabricated 
from steel sheets at the transit point. This raises the ques-
tion of the proper construction to be given to paragraph 
Three of Item 5, and Exceptions 2, 3 and 4. An example 
of this problem may be found in the first cause of action 
in Case No. 106336. It is listed in the referral order to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission as Question No. 5. 
Re_£ognJ~LI.l_g_..t.h.~.~techni~a:Utr _a!ld comple~ity _of· the 
terminology in the~:r;iff and' !_he lack of the .. <;QY!fi_jpri~­
dicti.ou to Jn-'lkre.~Jl ... det.e_trmJp~tiop. ~q( jts p_rop~r. ~~ani:ng_ as 
it is involved in these. _<;~s~~~- respondei.:J:.t in accordance with 
the mand~te qf!h~ .. §BJ!!"~!ll~~gg:g_tl_i:g.~_Q.?!ited States v. West-
ern Pacific R._ Co., 352 U. S. 59, 77 S. Ct. 161, 1 L. Ed. 2d 
. ·-- -· ~ . ·- .. ---.--- ~__.. . ._~_·. ~- . -~~-:....--------....-_ -. -·. ~ 
126, (1956)1. petitioned the district court on October 4, 
- ••• -·~·-· -·· ---· ·- .· - •• • . -~--. -.. -.-.-.-.- --~-_...,.-;..- "='"" - ..• -..·.;:-~·--:. --- ··-; .,...--.__J"',.ll-~--..-~-
19.5.7,_.i.or. anorde.r...ofrefe.r.xal~p:C.five specific issues of {3~ 
and tariff construction to the Interstate Commerce Com-
---~· 0""'"; ---·-· --. ------------ ---~-- ·--~--- ... --~-=~="~~-.:-. ....... ~~..,..........~ 
mission for determination and to hold the trials of the 
·- • • . .... ~;..... • ....... • ... .._.; .. -;;._;..!..:._....., ........ , ..• .1.-'···~.-·-;';-::~-::--:---·,.._l.!-,·~ . <:;.::...~-~ ~-~--::~ ~, t • . .... l"ll"':'C~~-1"-.......-'9:>~ 
la,7~~!li!~.J~ ~peyance .. -y.ntU t~is h~~-Jt~en com_pl~ (R!.,-87-
39). On November 8, 1957, by memorandum decision, the 
district court in granting said referral stated : 
"The lawsuit primarily involves a recovery of 
charges for carriage of steel products. Primary 
jurisdiction of that cause is in the Utah District 
Court. Within the overall controversy are issues, the 
adequate consideration of which would require an 
acquaintance of many intricate facts of transporta-
tion. Settlement of these issues seems to involve an 
inquiry which is essentially one of fact and of dis-
cretion in technical matters. This, under the best 
reasoning- of the cases cited, is for the Interstate 
Commerce Commission" (R. 40). 
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The order of referral, dated November 12, 1957 (R. 
42-43) submitted the issues of tariff interpretation and 
issues of fact to the Interstate Commerce Commission and 
held the causes in a~eyance durin.g the interim and re-
tained jurisdiction of the causes. for all purposes. 
The five questions involving the construction of Tariff 
7188-P in the order of referral to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission are as follows: 
"1. Is a transit operator entitled to the bal-
ance of through rate on the unfabricated and unre-
worked products contained in an outbound mixed 
shipment consisting of some transit fabricated or 
reworked products and some unfabricated andjor 
unreworked products, if the unfabricated andjor un-
reworked products are products listed in Item 5 of 
said tariff, assuming the transit operator has com-
plied with all other essential provisions of said 
tariff? 
"2. Is a transit operator entitled to the balance 
of through rate on outbound straight carload ship-
ments of products listed in I tern 5 of said tariff if 
said products have merelx_.!?ee_rl "§t9r"~9 .. ~t .. the transjt 
station .. 3ud,...,hilYe.JlQ;tbeeJl."!abx.ica.ted or reworked at 
the transit station? 
"3. Is a transit operator entitled to the balance 
of through rate on an outbound product which is 
fabricated or reworked but which could not have 
been fabricated in whole or in part from the com-
modity represented by the inbound billing surren-
dered, assuming that all other provisions of said 
tariff have been compli~d with by the transit oper-
ator? 
"4. Is the transit operator entitled to the bal-
ance of through rate on commodities not unloaded 
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into the warehouse or manufacturing plant of the 
outbound shipper and not transferred to the out-
bound shipper together with the inbound freight 
bill or tonnage credit slip under certification? 
"5. Is a transit operator entitled to surrender 
transit credits covering inbound shipments of steel 
sheets as a basis for claiming the balance of through 
rate on outbound shipments of coated and wrapped 
pipe?" 
Appellant filed a petition for intermediate appeal on 
or about December 11, 1957, and respondent filed timely 
answer. On April 2, 1958, the Supreme Court denied the 
petition. However, on appellant's filing a motion for re-
consideration of the petition and for oral orgument, to 
which a motion to dismiss was filed, the Supreme Court, 
on April 22, 1958, vacated the order of April 2, 1958, and 
granted the interlocutory appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH DISTRICT COUR'f, A COURT OF 
GENERAL JURISDICTION, HAS THE POWER 
AND THE DUTY TO REFER ISSUES TO THE 
INTERSTATE C 0 M MER C E COMMISSION 
WHEN THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JUR-
ISDICTION IS APPLICABLE. 
A. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 
B. When primary jurisdiction applies, the issues 
for determination are within the exclusive 
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province of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. 
C. It is immaterial whether the referral is upon 
instigation of the carrier or the shipper. 
D. It is immaterial whether the referral in this 
case is from a state or federal district court, 
they being both courts of general and concur-
rent jurisdiction. 
E. Referral to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion is not barred by the Statute of Limita-
tions under 49 U.S. C. A. 16 (3) even though 
more than two years have elapsed since the 
causes of action accrued. 
POINT II. 
THE NECESSITY FOR DETERMINATION OF 
FACTS FROM EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AND 
THE PROBLEMS OF TARIFF CONSTRUC-
TION PRESENT ISSUES IN THESE CAUSES 
WITHIN THE SPECIAL COMPETENCE OF 
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JUR-
ISDICTION, AND THE DISTRICT COURT COR-
RECTLY ALLOCATED THE ISSUES IN THE 
SUITS. 
A. The questions referred to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission for construction raise is-
sues of transportation policy which must be 
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considered by the Commission in the interests 
of uniform and expert administration. 
B. Suspension of the judicial process and reten-
tion of jurisdiction by the district court for 
all purposes was proper since, upon return, 
the court must determine all remaining issues 
of fact and law, award damages, if proper, 
and enforce judgments, if any. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH DISTRICT COURT, A COURT OF 
GENERAL JURISDICTION, HAS THE POWER 
AND. THE DUTY TO REFER ISSUES TO THE 
INTERSTATE C 0 M MER C E COMMISSION 
WHEN THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JUR-
ISDICTION IS APPLICABLE. 
A. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 
Primary jurisdiction is a principle which determines 
whether an administration agency or a court of general 
jurisdiction should decide certain questions. If applicable, 
it requires that those questions or issues in a claim be 
brought to the agency for determination before the entire 
controversy in the court of general jurisdiction is resolved. 
Its purpose is to provide a uniform application of rules, 
rates and regulations in regulated industries and to secure 
the aid of those who are trained and experienced in a par-
ticular technical field. The concept is frequently expressed 
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by reference to the wording of the Supreme Court in Far 
East Conference v. United States, 342 U. S. 570, 574, 72 S. 
Ct. 492, 96 L. Ed. 576 ( 1952) : 
"* * * a principle, now firmly established, 
is that in cases raising issues of fact not within the 
conventional experience of judges or cases requiring 
the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies 
created by Congress for regulating the subject mat-
ter should not be passed over. This is so even though 
the facts after they have been appraised by special-
ized competence serve as a premise for legal conse-
quences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and 
consistency in the regulation of business entrusted 
to a particular agency are secured, and the limited 
functions of review by the judiciary are more ration-
ally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertain-
ing and interpreting the circumstances under lying 
legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than 
courts by specialization, by insight gained through 
experience, and by more flexible procedure." 
The doctrine was first conceived in Texas & P. R. Co. 
v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350, 51 
L. Ed. 553, in 1907. Justice White, "its innovator, gifted 
in this instance with extraordinary prevision, underpinned 
the doctrine with a rationale which is still accepted." von 
Mehren, The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 Harv. L. 
Rev. 929, at 932 (1954). 
"The substance of the doctrine is that where 
by appropriate legislation an administrative agency 
is vested with juris diction under a regulatory scheme 
to set rules, regulations and standards of conduct 
and performance in technical, scientific and compli-
cated matters of commercial and industrial activity, 
judicial process will not be exercised in damage 
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claims involving determination of the same rules, 
regulations and standards without reference to ad-
ministrative action thereon. This means that even 
though court jurisdiction to entertain a common law 
right of action exists, exercise thereof will be sus-
pended pending administrative determination of 
matters essential to the action as to which primary 
jurisdiction has been vested in an administrative 
agency by legislative action. Precise language to 
such effect is not always found in legislative acts 
to which courts have applied the primary jurisdic-
tion principle." Ellison v. Rayonier, Inc., 156 F. 
Supp. 214, at 218, 219 (W. D., Wash., 1957). 
Since its origin primary jurisdiction has grown rapidly 
and although its first application was in the field of inter-
state commerce, "the principle is clearly applicable when-
ever courts and agencies have concurrent jurisdiction." 
Davis, Administrative Law, (1951) at 669. 
The latest application of the doctrine by the Supreme 
Court was in United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., supra, 
where a clear analysis is stated beginning at page 62 as 
follows: 
"We are met at the outset with the question 
of whether the Court of Claims properly applied the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction in ths case; tl!@.!, is, 
whether it correctly allocated the .issues in the .. .suit 
between ,ibe jur.isd.i..cti~ut.Pf~_the l.:tlt~r&tate_ Commerce 
Commission a.ud that _of. the court. * * * be-
cause we regard the maintenance of a proper rela-
tionship between the courts and the Commission in 
matters affecting transportation policy to be of con-
tinuing public concern, we have been constrained to 
inquire into this aspect of the decision. We have con-
cluded that in the circumstances here presented the 
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question of tariff construction, as well as that of the 
reasonableness of the tariff as applied, was within 
the exclusive primary juris diction of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. 
"The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, like the 
rule requiring exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies, is concerned with promoting proper relation-
ships between the courts and administrative agen-
cies charged with particular regulatory duties. 'Ex-
haustion' applies where a claim is cognizable in the 
first instance by an administrative agency alone; 
judicial interference is withheld until the adminis-
trative process has run its course. 'Primary juris-
diction,' on the other hand, applies where a claim is 
orginally cognizable in the courts, and comes into 
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the 
resolution of fssues which, under a regulatory 
scheme, have been placed within the special compe-
tence of an administrative body; in such a case the 
judicial process is suspended pending referral of 
such issues to the administrative body for its views. 
General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Ter-
minal Co., 308 U. S. 422, 433. 
"No fixed formula exists for applying the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction. In every case the 
question is whether the reasons for the existence of 
the doctrine are present and whether the purposes 
it serves will be aided by its application in the par-
ticular litigation. These· reasons and purposes have 
often been given expression by this Court. In the 
earlier cases emphasis was laid on the desirable uni-
formity which would obtain if initially a specialized 
agency passed on certain types of administrative 
questions. See Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene 
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426. More_r,g,~tJy the 
~~E~rt ___ ~EM~-·--,~·pe~~!al!~~~ -~P9'Y!~flzg· __ ,Qf_~tJt~, agen.c~es. 
iJl.v__oJved -~b.fu"·--· _been pa:rti.cuJar ly -~,&txe.ss.ed. * * * 
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The doctrine of primary jurisdiction thus does 'more 
than prescribe the mere procedural time table of 
the lawsuit. It is a doctrine allocating the law-mak-
ing power over certain aspects' of commercial rela-
tion. 'It transfers from court to agency the power 
to determine' some of the incidents of such relations." 
Appellant has selected statements of various writers 
who have criticized the doctrine or its origin (App. Br. 11, 
18), leaving an inference of its general disapproval. This 
is not the fact. Even these writers recognize the powerful 
reasons for the doctrine or its merit.* Others are out-
spoken in its favor; for example, von Mehren, supra, at 965, 
states: 
"The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is essen-
tial to effective regulation. Without it members of 
regulated industries would be subject to the com-
mands of two masters-the regulatory statute as ad-
ministered by the agency and the * * * laws as 
administered by the courts. Although in some in-
stances regulated companies should respond to the 
commands of both agency and court, they should not 
be required to do so until the agency has defined its 
interest in the matter to be considered by the court. 
This is all that primary jurisdiction doctrine seeks 
to achieve." 
However, while writers have disagreed on some of its 
aspects, the doctrine is firmly integrated into the law, and 
the courts' only function is its proper application. 
*Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconside'l'ed, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577, at 
604 (1954). 
Davis, supra, at 665. 
Convisser, Prinw,ry Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its Rationali.zations, 
65 Yale L. J. 315 (1956). 
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Appellant, we submit, is in error in its analysis of the 
basic nature of the doctrine. (App. Br. 18-20.) It i~_tb_~r.~ 
asserted that_nrimaryJum.di~timLinY.Q}ves _a.n initial con-
current jurisdiction PJ~tW~!Hl.tb,e.~.JiroJDistrative_ and judicial 
forums_,_ and since Jh~L.:R.ailroad has ..110 .. right. to. c.ommence 
its_ initial action J~efQ:re ... t.be __ Commission, as_ contra.sted.-±o .a. 
shipper given the alternate !.~c~.Q:tp:§.~.,-tQ_Jh.e.. Comrnissio:p.~o:r 
tb£l~.tl~r.~l.£<:nrrtJJ!t<Jer~-s~~tJQn _l}~Qf tll.JLA~t < L.l~ JJ. ._,s._. G.~ A. 
Sec. 9), there i~_.!!Q.Jp.ilj~~J cqncurrent jqrisdiction and tbqs 
the doctrine doe..a.JlQ .. Lc.ome_.into.~.play. The premise for ap-
pellant's conclusion is a statement by Davis, supra, at 664: 
"Questions of primary jurisdiction arise only 
when the statutory arrangements are such that ad-
ministrative and judicial jurisdiction are concurrent 
for the initial decision of some questions." 
An examination of Davis' analysis of Primary Juris-
diction (pp. 664-675), from which this statement was 
taken, reveals its proper meaning. It is merely to distin-
guish and contrast the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 
from other doctrines involved in the division of functions 
between the courts and administrative agencies, notably, 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The latter controls 
the timing of judicial relief from agency action, and j ur-
isdiction is in a single forum at all times. Primary ju.r..is.-
diction, on the other .. hand, _.is nqt concerned _)Y~t1tj_l1d..i~i-~l 
revie.!Y..,_ but decides whether .the .. Jnitial.. determination of 
sqme -~qP:~~!~o~s -~hould_ be by .. th~ court in ~hich the action 
was commenced and is pending or by the_ appr_o_priate. ad-
mfuistra.ti.Ye agency. Thus there must be concurrent juris-
diction both in the court and the agency to hear and decide 
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certain questions in a given field, such as interstate com-
merce, but OJ!~~L!P.~_det~!m!n&t!9!tJ~ !P$l~l~~ tl!~tth~ ~g_ep.~y 
s·P:2.!!!4 ma~e th~~~.~i§l91!~~9J_ eertaip> questions, it§.iu:r:~dic­
tion is . e:xclusive. 
Appellant has also applied the concurrent aspect of the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction prematurely. The determ-
iiJ~.ti.9JLQf wheth.er .. thtLcQurt...ox.. t~ncL should ma._Ire.'"tl!tL 
initiaLJle_cisio~J~L . llQLconsidered_JJntil aft.e.t:..-tbe. original 
clai.mjs cognizable .in ~ court of generaljurisdiction ... United 
States v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra, at 64. 
The reference by appellant to Section 9 of the Act as 
an example of concurrent administrative and judicial jur-
isdiction between the Commission and the federal courts 
in the case of a shipper commencing the action, is also in 
error. That section merely gives a shipper alternative 
remedies in "suit (s) * * * for the recovery of the 
damages for which * * * (a) common carrier may be 
liable under the provisions of this chapter," ( 49 U. S. C. A., 
Sec. 9) and a shipper cannot file his action in the federal 
court under Section 9 where his claim for damages neces-
sarily involves a question of reasonableness, calling for the 
exercise of the Commission's exclusive primary jurisdiction. 
United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 337 U. 
S. 426, 69 S. Ct. 1410, 93 L. Ed 1451 (1949) ; Feinstein v. 
New York Central Railroad Co., 159 F. Supp. 460, at 464 
(S. D., N. Y., 1958), and cases cited therein. 
B. When primary jurisdiction applies, the issues 
for determination are within the exclusive 
province of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. 
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Where certain issues within an overall controversy 
must properly be referred to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for its determination, the court loses its jurisdiction 
to hear and decide those issues, and the judicial process is 
suspended. The sole forum with the power to determine 
those issues is the agency. 
"* * * Whenever enforcement of the claim 
requires the resolution of issues which, under a reg-
ulatory scheme, have been placed within the special 
competence of an administrative body" (United 
States v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra, at 64), 
those issues are "within the exclusive primary jur-
isdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission." 
!d., 63, (Emphasis added). 
"The * * * language of the Supreme Court 
in the Western Pacific case is imperative in its ef-
fect. It held that as to question of tariff construc-
tion and reasonableness of rate as applied, that 
question 'was within the exclusive primary jurisdic-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Commission.' * * * 
The word exclusive means 'shut out,' 'debarring 
from participation.' Black's Law Dictionary notes, 
'These words preclude the idea of co-existence, and 
mean possessed to the exclusion of others.'" United 
States v. Apicella, 148 F. Supp. 457, 458, (D., N. J., 
1957). 
See also: Armour & Co. v. Alton R. Co., 312 U. S. 195, 
61 S. Ct. 498, 85 L. Ed. 771 (1941) ; General American Tank 
Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U. S. 422, 60 S. 
Ct. 325, 84 L. Ed. 361 (1940) ; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. 
Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285, 42 S. Ct. 477, 66 L. 
Ed. 943 (1922); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Solum, 247 
U.S. 477, 38 S. Ct. 550, 62 L. Ed. 1221 (1918) ; Northwest-
,ern Auto Parts Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 240 F. 2d 743, 
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749 (C. C. A.-8, 1957) ; United States v. Kansas City South-
ern Railway Co., 217 F. 2d 763 (C. C. A.-8, 1954); Northern 
Pa.c. Ry. Co. v. United States, 213 F. 2d 366 (C. C. A.-8, 
1954) ; Western Oil & Fuel Co. v. Great Lakes Pipe Line 
Co., 210 F. 2d 490 (C. C. A.-8, 1954) ; and United States v. 
Alaska S. S. Co., 110 F. Supp. 104 (W. D., Wash., 1952). 
C. It is immaterial whether the referral is upon 
instigation of the carrier or the shipper. 
Appellant has much to say about the fact that the peti-
tion for referral was by the carrier rather than by the 
shipper. It also makes the unfounded claim that Union 
Pacific is attempting, by a device, to gain access to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (App. Br. 6). 
It is not disputed that there is no statute allowing 
Union Pacific to initiate an original proceeding in these 
cases before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The 
Federal statute provides only for actions at law ( 49 U. S. 
C. A., Sec. 16 (3)). Nor is it disputed that a shipper has 
dual initial remedies in actions against carrier for damages 
( 49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 9 and 13). Byt_!!Ql!~J?f_ these statp.tg~ 
~~. C<?"!!cer.~~d JYJth primary j !!ri.s_djctiOll..___ 
Since the issues allocated to the Commission under the 
doctrine are exclusively within its jurisdiction, there is no 
court of general jurisdiction with the power to hear and 
decide such issues. Tperef.<?:r~~ jf ~ll~ sh~pper doea..not..ask 
for the referral, as was the case here, it i~UhEt_~gutL gf ~he 
carrier._tq_99. so. Otherwise the __ n:J..a.ndate of the._ Supreme 
C<?!-!.~i.l~~ ~q<?.}Y.!:l ... i.~w~t!t~~ ... J.f§st~_Eaci[ic_ ~~se.__lYould be ig: 
no:r~.Q~ . an~ issu~~ _ _Erop_~Jl allQ_cable .~!-~ age.IJ.£L_'X_ould 
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remaixtin_tb_e court of_gen._Etl:a_Lj Qt.isdicti9.1l...at.1b.lLWllim ~~f 
the_ shipper. 
This is not a reference for the specific purpose of hav-
ing the Commission determine the respondent's claim (App. 
Br., 6) ; it is simply a reference of those issues within the 
lawsuit which call for the aid of an agency schooled in 
unraveling the mysteries of tariff construction. In such 
matters the Commission, under law, has preempted the 
field. 
The Conuni~~_io:n's,ct~t~r:mi~ation will P~- equ~lly_}l.!JJ.ding 
o~_ all parties to the suit, and the result~_ mJ;tY .b~J~_yox.~'bl~ 
to shi;uper. a ILQ~sibiJJty_ -~'YlliG..l!.,~J~.J)p_~Jl~nt __ h~§ __ Ju>~~rently 
ignored. Both parties are entitled to appear before the 
Commission to protect their interests and participate in 
the proceedings. The ultimate result is therefore the same 
regardless of which party seeks the initial referral. 
The question of referral on petition of the carrier 
came before the court in United States v. Canfield Drive-
away Co., 159 F. Supp. 448 (E. D., Mich., 1958). In that 
case the court readily recognized the holding of the Western 
Pacific case and ordered that the referral be made. At page 
455 the court stated: 
"In this case, however, it is the carrier, whose 
charges have been paid in full, who insists that a 
reference be made. The Court cannot find a spelling 
out of procedure whereby a carrier situated as the 
defendant in this case, would initiate a proceeding 
before the Interstate Commerce Commission. I do 
not find any decided case in which the application 
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies, with 
the procedural background of the case at Bar. :t{Qjr. 
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withstandin~-ho...weYer, that tber.a.s..e.ema.=to be 119 
~ell-defin_~g ... I!r9_,G~Q.!lr~l.Pa tlt _tQ _. _f, ()]l()W, jf ~.th~- _.<jQC;; 
t:t:Jne _gf~1h~-,!f~~§1~IJ! Eff.cifjc J~~$e Js. J_Q_ be. followed}.. 
t:Q_J§ ... 9.9l!!:t sho:gJ9. not ~gt helpless merely_b_e..c~l1S~ h~ 
<lo..e.s__noJ __ ~.iind ._ a Co uti.., rule or procedural .. statute... . 
which_gjy~~-spe~jfic qire~tion J!,§_ to .llow_j~_o=_proce~d." 
The same situation gave no trouble to the court in 
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, supra. There the 
carrier initiated the action and contended on appeal that 
the trial court could not make a preliminary determination 
of whether the words in the disputed tariff were used in a 
peculiar or extraordinary sense. The trial court had made 
the determination in favor of the shipper and the appellate 
court reversed, holding that the question was one of fact, 
which would have to be determined by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. 
D. It is immaterial whether the referral in this 
case is from a state or federal district court, 
they being both courts of general and concur-
rent jurisdiction. 
The main thrust of appellant's argument in this appeal 
is based upon the fact that the actions were commenced in 
the state rather than the federal district cou1·t. Appellant 
claims that referral to a federal administrative agency is 
beyond what the state tribunal should do voluntarily and,· 
as a matter of law, cannot otherwise do. The reasoning for 
this argument seems to be: first, it is undesirable to refer 
because of the reluctance of the state courts to abdicate 
their jurisdiction ; second, reference to an agency outside 
the scope of the state judicial and administrative system 
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violates both separation of powers and federalism; and 
third, the Interstate Commerce Commission has no respon-
sibility to the state court. 
It is interesting to nQte t.hat~Jhe __ QoGtx..in.~~QI,. priroJJ,fY 
jurisdiction =-!~§J!lte.9 .... JX.9ID .. J!.J~~~t~,..J~.Q1Jri,_ P!:Q.~~~_c;U.nK~--··. In 
Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., supra, the ship-
per commenced its action in a state court of Texas to re-
cover damages for excessive freight charges. The reason-
ableness of the rate was at issue, and the state appellate 
court held that such issue could be determined by the court 
even though the rate had been filed and promulgated by the 
carrier pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act. The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the uniform appli-
cation of rates to all required that the sole determination of 
unreasonableness of rates be vested solely within the Com-
mission. Thus the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was 
born and a principle established which has not varied since: 
Wheue.ve.:r. _the .. J~~ue_ J>eJQ:r..e .. ~tb~. c_Q_lJI.tJ.nYQl¥e~"- the que~tion 
ot pn:r~-~§Q!!~bl~.!!.~~§-~Qf .. ~ ,.:r~a,.te, Jh.~ .~X:<;ll!~ty_e ,_.P:rtmary juris-
di~J.!Qll is. Jn _t}le Commission,_ and no_co~rt, be it _.state or 
fede,rJJ.l., has the power to proceed. United States v. Inter-
state Commerce Commission, supra. 
It is apparent from the holding of the Abilene case that 
where issues are within the primary jursdiction of the 
Commission, a state court has no jurisdiction. It also illus-
trates that appellant's argument that state courts are reluc-
tant to give away jurisdiction, is without merit. 
A question arose as to whether Abilene wholly super-
seded the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts in inter-
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state commerce matters. That problem was solved in 
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Co., 237 U. S. 121, 35 
S. -Ct. 484, 59 L. Ed. 867 ( 1915), involving a suit in a state 
court by a shipper for damages caused by the carrier's 
refusal to furnish cars. The Supreme Court held that Sec-
tion 22 of the Act (49 U.S. C. A., Sec. 22), which preserved 
all common law and statutory remedies, thus allowing suits 
in state courts, was not superseded by the holding in the 
Abilene case ; but _!he ~Ql!!:~ _ _P-2!_~t~.(L.Q_lJ_t tb~t _ t}JJ~re was no 
juri_S.~~ct!ol1_ ip ~tate, as ~ell_a,s J~qer~l_~Q!l~ under_ Section 
9, where the issue involved was the "determination of mat-
---'"""" ....... ----- ,, . - .. - - -.,~· -- ~- -· , .. ~---,.--_·- - -~ ... ---~--- -. . ----- - -
ters _cal~ing f9:r_ t~e. _gx~r~i§~~-ot ~~gmt!!i§t!~!iv~ -~9W~r_and 
discretion of the Commission." I d., at 130. Thus the state 
~--------<-.;-.---~ - .:; __ - . -
courts were retained in the operative scheme of primary 
jurisdiction in the same manner as it applied to federal 
courts. 
In Great Northern Ry. Co., v. Merchants' Elev. Co., 
supra, the problem for decision was tariff construction 
rather than reasonableness of rates. Here again the action 
was commenced in a state court of general jurisdiction. The 
Minnesota trial court construed the meaning of the tariff 
rather than referring the matter to the Commission, and 
the Supreme Coutt affirmed. The issue was: "whether 
any court had jurisdiction of the controversy, in view of the 
fact that the Interstate Commerce Commission had not 
passed upon the disputed question of construction." Id., 
290 The court held that the disputed question of construc-
tion, being one wholly of law, was properly a matter for 
the court to make the determination, and therefore referral 
to the Interstate Commerce Commission was unnecessary. The 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
juri~9~£t!Qn.._!it.- determine matters .of.. J~r~ff construction 
ipvolyJng w§ol~JX~ ql1estiQns _ oJ law ._!Yas JPJ!~ J~!t in the_ state 
coy:rt_s~ However, the Supreme Court recog_nizedthat when-
ever extrin.§ic .. ~_vid~l!.C..~. may _Q.{L ne~~§s~ry JQ. _q~t~rm~ne dth~t 
meaning of words used in the tariff in a peculiar or techni-
__._...._ ................ .-uo<~:o.>-.1·- ..... J ..... ~· ... ~ .. :.-.• • .. __ .~.~-·".-:' ....... ~, ···- ·-~-·· .•'-' . ' - ~-·· --·~ -·--· _-_ .· '----- -
cal sen§g__,__Qr_JgJ~§ta.blish a usag_e_ of tra(le_ or _locality which 
attaches provisions not expressed in the tariff, "the pre-
liminary determination must be made by the Commissio:q; 
and not until this determination has been made, can a cour~ 
take jurisdiction of the controversy." /d., 292. The meaning 
of the language is clear: If the state court proceeding had 
involved tariff construction where preliminary resort to 
the Commission was necessary, the Supreme Court would 
have directed the state court to withhold its proceeding 
until the matter of primary jurisdiction had been concluded. 
As Justice Brandeis states: 
"If this were not so, that uniformity which it 
is the purpose of the Commerce Act to secure could 
not be attained." ld., 292. 
The cases before the Court on this appeal involve noth-
ing more than the situation described in the Great Northern 
case, requiring preliminary resort and determination by the 
Commission. 
In its development, as the foregoing cases illustrate, 
primary jurisdiction was applied in two separate fields of 
interstate transportation: iir§.t_,~ in t~~--~:r:~a _()f. reasonable-
ness~ot r~tes, pr~,Gtj~g~, and rules, where the jurisdiction 
of the Co:rpmisst~utJ~~J.§Q.. excl u_~jy~ ;~ ... ~.n.<i ~eGpnd, j:p._tariff 
construGJtiQpJ.~/Wb~r_g, t4~ jurisdic:tiqn _of the Commission is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
a}§Q,Jz';.q~Jy~j v~, _b~ut QDly where the jssue for determination 
is _J!tQX~ . t1H!!t~9Jely ~Jl.lJ~~~t!Q!L9!J~W· It is helpful to have 
this in mind in examining the decisions of state courts con-
fronted with the problem, since the determination of 
whether the court or the Interstate Commerce Commission 
should make the initial decision of certain questions, is the 
same in both fields. 
In T. Mendelson Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 332 Pa. 
'470, 2 A. 2d 820, (1838), shippers attempted to enjoin the 
carrier from opening packaged perishable goods to deter-
mine the nature and extent of damage at the time of de-
livery, on the grounds that the practice was unreasonable. 
The trial court denied the injunction on the ground the 
exclusive jurisdiction was in the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. In affirming, the State Supreme Court, at page 
822, said: 
"The court below properly decided that the jur-
isdiction of the Commission is exclusive in matters 
of this character. When rules, regulations and prac-
tices in interstate commerce are attacked as being 
unreasonable in their operation, the law provides 
a forum, the Interstate Commerce Commission, for 
the settlement of this disputed question. That forum 
must be resorted to before the courts can interfere. 
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 
259 U. S. 285, 291, 42 S. Ct. 577, 66 L. Ed. 943. 
Though state courts may assume equitable jurisdic-
tion in proper cases, ·zchen they attempt to invade 
a field occupied by Federal control under Federal 
laws, they will be prohibited from entertaining jur-
isdiction. Under the facts as shown by the pleadings, 
the Interstate Commerce Commission had jurisdic-
tion. Here the duty devolves on the carrier to de-
termine the 'practice.' The commission polices the 
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carriers' rules and practices. It is an administra-
tiy~ ___ mg._tter~.Qf_ which_ ":tR.e. Commissi-on--ll.as ___ -special 
knowledge ;_v--~ ... t~~-h.:P.i<;al ___ p:rqbJ~m. b~t.t~r ___ left __ to __ the 
i:g!!i~t§~!l.4Y. qf ~ransportation specialists. r· The l~J;.IJ­
nical nature of the subject, and the peculiar ability 
of an administrative body to examine it, suffice as 
a matter of public pDlicy to displace preliminary 
court action. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
In Union Transfer Co. v. Renstrom, 151 Neb. 326, 37 
N. W. 2d 383 (1949), a carrier commenced action for under-
charges. The issue was whether the rate for finished or 
unfinished stampings applied. The shipper claimed the 
court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, 
the court pointed out at page 386 : 
"The Interstate Commerce Act, as adopted and 
thereafter amended from time to time, never pur-
ported to exclusively confine the field of jurisdic-
tion to the Interstate Commerce Commission, but as 
a matter of fact was cumulative and actually re-
served to the shipper and carrier all common law 
and statutory remedies not repugnant to its provi-
sions. Title 49, s. 22, U. S. C. A. of the Interstate 
Commerce Act * * * " 
"It is generally th~appli~a"Ql~xuJ~ ~ha~~JW_h~n the 
r~_asol1a bl~ness, __ di.~-~;riminato_ry -~Char~G.te.r , __ Q.r.:. valid-
ity of -~pprpved, . filed,_ -~nd publis_l,l~~- t~rjff' r~~-~~ ~s 
not. __ as~~ileq, -~-~Q __ }!Q. __ question J;tff_~ctiD:g tb.~--power 
o:r_ administra~ive_ di~cretion or judgment of the In-
terstate Commerce Commission already exercised or 
to be exercised is involved,. but the controversy 
mereJy ip.v_9lve~ t~~· q:t!estion,_ of _w}leth.:~r. Qr ~~! the 
carrier p~§. exacte<:l the rate prescribed in its tariff, 
courts }1ave jurisd~ction o! the subjectm;;ttter. * * *" 
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"* * * the applicabl~-1~~----llla.intiff's 
publi~l).ed tariff wer~_Gle_arJy_~unambiguDus.and,w.ith­
out any~ p~cqJ!a..r_txa45i-.u_sage _1>.r~. D1~~:PJIJ.g. .. * * * 
Such a case presented factual and legal questions in 
nowise different from any other factual or legal 
issue determinable by courts and juries, and courts 
have original jurisdiction to try such cases." 
The court found jurisdiction based upon the rationale 
of the Great Northern case, while recognizing that state 
courts do not have jurisdiction of those issues allocable 
under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 
Walters v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 220 Ky. 813, 295 
S. W. 1010 (1927), involved a question of a mathematical 
calculation to determine the proper freight charges in dis-
pute. The trial court dismissed the action upon the grounds 
the questions involved were administrative ones, and there-
fore exclus~ve jurisdiction was in the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. While recognizing the rule of primary juris-
diction, the Appellate Court reversed, holding that the only 
problem involved was a determination of mathematical 
computations and therefore resort to the Commission was 
unnecessary. 
The court's basis for arriving at this conclusion, stated 
at page 1011, is as follows: 
"In order, * * * for the question to be one 
for the exclusive consideration by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission there must be a disputed 
question affecting the classification, and, resultingly, 
the rates, and that question must be of such a na-
ture as that courts and juries might reasonably dis-
agree, and in th~ -~Q!.~!.llim. __ ~f _ _Fhich~ r~!!Ui!~ ... ~qe 
e~ercise .. Qf expert. _l.il.!QW ledge_ .. Qf __ f~-~~~- ~~.Q pr~~tiG~~ 
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upon :wntch the classificat~o.ILia. based. It necessarily 
follows, therefore, that, if the question to be solved 
is not of the nature indicated and consists only in 
mathematical calculations, it does not become one 
exclusively for the Interstate Commerce Commission 
to solve. If only a mathematical calculation will 
solve the litigated question, there is nothing to 
deprive the proper court, state or federal, of its 
jurisdiction to find facts for the correct basis for 
the calculation and give judgment accordingly. As 
we have seen, there is no dispute in this case as to 
the correct classification, or as to the rates applicable 
to the classification. There is, therefore, no question 
requiring expert knowledge, nor one about which 
juries or courts might reasonably disagree." 
Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Johns & Patterson, 
201 Ky. 752, 258 S. W. 312 (1924), involved the question 
of determining when used clothing ceased to be clothing and 
became rags. The defendant carrier claimed the proper 
classification and rating of the shipment involved adminis-
trative questions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. In considering this mat-
ter the court stated: 
"This latter contention will be considered first, 
since, if true, ordinary courts, both state and federal, 
are without jurisdiction to determine the dispute." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Upon consideration the state appellate court determined 
that the referral was necessary and therefore the trial court 
had no jurisdiction. 
The foregoing cases are sufficient, we believe, to illus-
trate the uniform application of federal primary jurisdic-
tion by state courts. See also Hewett v. New York, N. H. 
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& H. R. Co., 284 N. Y. 117, 29 N. E. 2d 641 (1940) ; Miller 
v. Davis, 213 Ia. 1091, 240 N. W. 743 (1932); Chicago M. 
St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Ricketson Min. Color Works, 218 Wis. 
37, 259 N. W. 722 (1935) ; Knight v. Pennsylvania R. R., 
280 Ky. 191, 132 S. W. 2d 950 (1939) ; Beck & Gregg Hard-
ware Co. v. Cook, 210 Ga. 608, 82 S. E. 2d 4 (1954); Illinois 
Central R. Co. v. N. T. Reed Const. Co., 51 So. 2d 573 (Miss., 
1951) ; Texas Steel Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 70 S. 
W. 2d 484 (Tex., 1934) ; and Anno. in 64 A. L. R. 333 et 
seq. and 97 A. L. R. 406 et seq. 
There is not a single state court case above cited, or 
found by us, supporting the claim of appellant that the 
state court should not or cannot make a referral to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission when the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction is applicable. On the contrary, they, 
together with the Supreme Court pronouncements hereto-
fore cited and considered, fully support the referral in this 
case. In addition, the compelling reason for the establish-
ment of primary jurisdiction in the Abilene case, i. e., uni-
formity is equally present here. See 11 Am. Jur., Com-
merce, Sec. 159. 
Although in our court system there are separate state 
and federal forums, in many areas they both apply the 
same jurisprudence. It is true that fed.eral courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction so far as the Constitution and the 
statutes of Congress enacted pursuant thereto so provide, 
and state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over matters 
not falling within the jurisdiction of federal courts. How-
ever, there are many fields involving federal matters such 
as interstate commerce, where there is concurrent juris-
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diction in state and federal tribunals. See 21 C. J. S., 
Courts, Sec. 524-526. 
"It is a general rule that where no inconsistency 
with the supremacy of the national government or 
its official agencies is concerned, the state courts 
have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts of 
actions arising under federal statutes, just as fed-
eral courts, subject to limitations imposed by the 
federal law itself, ha.ve concurrent jurisdiction with 
state courts of actions arising under state law." 
Thomas v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 127 Kan. 326, 
273 P. 451, 64 A. L. R. 322, 328 (1929) ; see also, 
Seaboard R. Co. v. Daniel, 333 U. S. 118, 68 S. Ct. 
426, 92 L. Ed. 580 ( 1948) . 
Neither party questions the basic concurrent j urisdic-
tion in the state court in this case, but appellant alleges 
that since the general jurisdiction of the state court has 
been invoked, that court should not and, as a matter of law, 
cannot refer any part of that ve.sted power to a federal 
administrative agency. But this argument has a fatal weak-
ness. The source of the original state court jurisdiction in 
this roilier is not the S'tate. Constitution-and ~stafutes;-a8 
~~~~~-!E2l~~J~~I:{ilkn.liii~~,i;~C1D:ilii~P~~!::~-· 
,9ql!¥E~~s, .. t~titJ'., .. ~~'"<tlM,~i.Y.t~t.right JR regl1l~.~" Jn.t.§r&iet~.,-~.?~:­
merce. Thus the power of the state court to step across 
....... - .. 
the threshhold and assume jurisdiction of any kind in these 
cases is wholly dependent on the federal law. 
"The power to regulate interstate commerce is 
vested in the Congress by art. 1, § 8, par. 3 of the 
Constitution of the United States. * * * The 
historical background of this clause of the Consti-
tution attests to the wisdom of thus giving the gen-
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eral Government supreme authority in this field. 
* * * in section 22 of the original act, 49 U. S. 
C. A., § 22, it is also provided that 'nothing in this 
chapter contained shall in any way abridge or alter 
the remedies now existing at common law or by stat-
ute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition 
to such remedies'. Thus the Congress plainly and 
unmistakably expresses its will and intention that 
rights of parties arising in interstate commerce 
transactions may be protected by the courts of the 
land, both Federal and State, so long as action in the 
courts are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
the act." Beck & Gregg Hardware Co. v. Cook, supra, 
at 7. 
Simply by repealil).g S_ection 22 of the Interstate Com-
-- - - - " -~---- --~--~""-~"""""'---·~:~ ..... ....-._.,~---.._~..,.~-------= ... -..=_,_ __ ~:;--·.,.,_.<--::.,--. . .- ... ~- ~--~~ 
IIl~rce_ Ac~, _Qongre~§~C91!LcL~9J:nPletely __ remQY~L concurrent 
jurisdiction from.~t-~t~- C.QYrt~ iiJ: the fiel_(l _of inter~tate com-
---·-- _;:-~;0-.. J~·..:··.•.:!.;.~.,:_. ~,••< ·!··~----M--~:··~'<1~'.-·' . .._..., __ ?'::'--t'~":"~--~''::.0 . ""f.;:.•"' • .:-·<:::~_:,._-."'"':>;:- ___ ,...._ __ ,.._~::< c~!.=-"7-~ •-T::~_;.....-;::.:::. • • .:;.....J_-. • .: .. ;-
merce*, and t~erefore the contention that the state court 
is being asked to abdicate some of its original power is 
wholly without merit. And, in granting to the state courts 
concurrent jurisdiction to deal with interstate commerce 
matters under Section 22, the state courts must have im-
plied authority to fully perform their assignments by, 
among other things, referring matters of an appropriate 
nature to the Commission. Hence, any questions of invasion 
and abdication of state court power are not involved. 
This is not a reference to an administrative body out-
side the scope of the state judicial system (App. Br. 37). 
It is a reference to a federal agency by a state court acting 
within the scope of the federal judicial system. Congress 
has delegated to the Commission the authority to determine 
*See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Co., supra, at page 130. 
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and decide matters within its primary jurisdiction and has 
delegated to the courts the right to entertain other actions 
involving interstate commerce. United States v. Garner, 
134 F. Supp. 16 (E. D., N. C., 1955). 
Therefore it would appear that Point IV of Appellant's 
Brief and the cases cited and discussed thereunder, are 
without application to any issue actually involved in these 
cases. 
Any colJrt,, construing _ an_ interstate tariff, "w.be.the~ . 
it . be stat~--Cl.~ ~9~JJ!!~mu_st. J!lill!Y tll~~-.Jt_ppli@Pl~ ___  f_~~ler:al 
law as outlin~~"Qr. the JJ:pJt~!!" .. StJ!t~~-- ~qprero~ ._Qourt. __ Gr.fHJt 
Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., supra, at 290; 
Bernstein Bros. Pipe & Machine Co. v. Denver & R. G. W. 
R. Co., 193 F. 2d 441 (C. C. A.-10, 1951). The basic pur-
pose underlying this requirement is to insure uniform 
application of substantive rules throughout the entire field 
governed by federal law, regardless of whether the state 
or the federal forum is initially invoked. The issue pre-
sented in these cases goes one step beyond the mere appli-
cation of federal substantive law. Here we have._a...fe.der.al 
jurisdictionaL_QQG.triP-t\ .and ... therefore, -~~, - fortiori, the state 
court m,ust _ .follQW jt. 
HThe doctrine of primary jurisdiction thus does 
'more than prescribe the mere procedural timetable 
of the law suit. It is a doctrine allocating the law-
making power over certain aspects' of commercial 
relations. 'It transfers from the court to agency the 
power to determine' some of the incidents of such 
relations." United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., 
supra, at 65. (Emphasis added.) 
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A converse situation to these cases is diversity of 
citizenship actions. Since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. 
S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938), federal courts 
have been bound to follow controlling rules of substantive 
law as declared by the state legislatures or highest state 
courts in all diversity cases, unless a Federal Constitution 
or statutory question is involved. Thus the ultimate deci-
sion of the case reached in the federal court is no different 
than if the case had been concluded in the state court. The 
same reasoning has equal force here. The state court's 
handling of a referral under the doctrine of primary juris-
diction must be the same as the corresponding handling in 
the federal court. 
The doctrine of referral by federal courts to state ad-
ministrative bodies to determine questions within their 
particular field was recognized by the federal district court 
in the state of Washington in Ellison v. Rayonier, supra. 
In that case actions were commenced by various tide land 
owners against a pulp and mill operator to recover dam-
ages for deterioration and death of oysters caused by water 
pollution. The basis of the court's jurisdiction was diversity 
of citizenship. The mill operator claimed that under the 
Washington Water Pollution Control Act primary jurisdic-
tion to determine standards of actionable pollution of state 
waters was vested in the Pollution Control Commission 
provided for in the Act. 
The federal court, applying Washington substantive 
law as it was bound to do, agreed, and there was no question 
that the federal court should not or could not make the 
referral to the state agency. Thus, even the federal courts 
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find no barrier to recognition of a state administrative 
agency when the states doctrine of primary jurisdiction 
applies. See also: Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Sauk River 
Lumber Co., 82 F. 2d 519 (C. C. A.-9, 1936). 
Proper heeg_l!!q§.t.J>jL,giYJm. .. ~to " .. th~~ pronou~11-G~mEID1s .ot 
t}le JJ.nl~!l __ States .. S_q.Jn~J~ID~.~~QQ:urt _<;oncerning o.th~ .... <l9_ctr~n.~ 
of prin:1.ary ju.risdiction. since it is . ..the~ paramount authority 
over ~l!_legal ... m.~t!~r~- pred~~~te.<t.<?n __ the. _Feq~raJ Con_~titu­
tj_gn .. ~J.Ul S.tatut.es~ _ And, wh~re it has spoken, its, W()rds_ are 
~ only -~ntitlEl~-.JE'" . ..,S"~~- deJe.renGe, .Jhey ar.~,--~,gn:tl.tled _t_Q 
"absolute 2~c~~~~"~~e." Knight v. Pennsylvania R. R., supra, 
at 953; South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U. S. 412, 420, 53 S. 
Ct. 667, 77 L. Ed. 1292 (1933). From Abilene to Western 
Pacific the Supreme Court has reiterated time and time 
again that when the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is 
applicable, the exclusive jurisdiction of the question to be 
referred is in the federal administrative agency. The state 
or federal court of general jurisdiction is therefore not 
concerned with discretion or desire, and once the determi-
nation has been made that primary jurisdiction is applic-
able, a duty to refer arises. The court's failure to do so 
would render its own determination nugatory and void, 
because it has no authority to decide that question. 
Appellant argues that the state court cannot make the 
referral because it has no control over the Commission. 
While it is true that there is no direct control by the state 
court over the agency, it does not follow that the court 
cannot make the referral. Erimary jurisdiction is not con-
eern~t<.t~.wit.!L~Qntrol by the. .Gou:rt over the agency _to_ .which 
referrals are rna_d.e, .. because _the power of determination 
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of,. the _g_JJ.eilion~x:eferx:ed--is~notin-=the~court. For example, 
the Court of Clail!l~E~E. no cont~9l. oy~_r the c!~~~!"~!~!~ Q_qm-
merc~ Commissiol!..in._th.!LWJ3~.t.~xn. Pacific case. ~In .. addition, 
adequ~t~, rem~d_i~SJlr~ available .against .any,_federaLagency 
in the fed~ra,l court~_ to insur~~t.h.~t.-~th.ey .will .. prop,er.ly ~I>~r­
form in all referral matters. --~-~ .... -;:,·l'f"'".-.;..'-·-~·.o...-;f ~· -_ .. ;. -- ...... , ..•. 
The state court did not order the Interstate Commerce 
Commission to make the determination (App. Br. 37) ; it 
simply ordered referral of "questions involving construction 
to the Interstate Commerce Commission for answer and 
determination by that body" (R. 42). Any Interstat~t.Com­
~-~~~"-"QQ.!!!Il!t§..~iQIL determination ~W9J!ld .. tb_eJ!,JJ.e.-. based on 
an j~~!!d~p_ipetit!Q11 by ~th~. responQ.~:uL!or _a declaratory 
order pursuant t.Q Sectio;n 5 (d) Q(Jb.~- ~<J.min~str~tive J>ro-
cedl]J;_~ Act. ( 5 .. V..~!_,Q.~A.;:. Sec. JO_Q~~~-J-~1-·l~ _ .. 
From. the foregoing reasons and authorities we con-
clude that whether Union Pacific Railroad Company com-
menced these proceedings in the United States District 
Court under 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1337* *, rather than in the 
state court as it did in these cases, makes no material dif-
ference on the question of referral to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission under the doctrine of federal primary 
jurisdiction. 
E. Referral to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion is not barred by the Statute of Limita-
*See Arizona Sand & Rock Co. v. SoutlH rn Pacific Co., 280 I. C. C. 285 
(1951). 
**Bernstein Bros. Pipe <-<'~ ll!achine Co. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 
supra; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Rice, 247 U. S. 201, 38 S. Ct. 429, 62 
L. Ed. 1071, ( 1918) ; c.f. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. TFillard 
Mirror Co., 160 F. Supp. 895 (W. D., Ark., 1958). 
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tions under 49 U. S. C. A. 16 (3) even though 
more than two years have elapsed since the 
causes of action accrued. 
Little need be said on this point. In United States v. 
Western Pac. R. Co., supra, the Supreme Court treats the 
matter of referral and the two-year statute of Limitations: 
"Section 16 (3) does not deal with referral 
questions to the Commission incident to judicial 
proceedings. On its face it has to do only with the 
commencement of actions or reparation proceedings 
before the Commission. There is therefore no lan-
guage which militates against the conclusion that 
the Statute does not apply to referrals." Id., at 72. 
See also: Northwestern Auto Parts Co. v. Chicago, B. 
& Q. R. Co., supra; United States v. T. I. M. E., Inc., 252 
F. 2d 178 (C. C. A.-5, 1958) ; and United States v. Chesa-
peake & Ohio R. Co., 352 U. S. 77, 81, 77 S. Ct. 172, 1 L. Ed. 
2d 140 (1956). 
POINT II. 
THE NECESSITY FOR DETERMINATION OF 
FACTS FROM EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AND 
THE PROBLEMS OF TARIFF CONSTRUC-
TION PRESENT ISSUES IN THESE CAUSES 
WITHIN THE SPECIAL COMPETENCE OF 
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JUR-
ISDICTION, AND THE DISTRICT COURT COR-
RECTLY ALLOCATED THE ISSUES IN THE 
SUITS. 
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A. The questions referred to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission for construction raise is-
sues of transportation policy which must be 
considered by the Commission in the interests 
of uniform and expert administration. 
Referral of the questions of tariff construction to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission by the District Court is 
based upon the holdings of three Supreme Court cases: 
Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. American Tie Co., 234 U. S. 138, 
34 S. Ct. 885, 58 L. Ed. 1255 ( 1914) ; Great Northern Ry. 
Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., supra; and United States 
v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra. These cases clearly dispose 
of Appellant's arguments that the issues of tariff construc-
tion in the present cases are within the jurisdiction of the 
court. 
In the Tie case the shipper sought damages from the 
carrier on the ground that its refusal to furnish cars for 
oak railroad cross ties was the cause of I osing a contract 
with a third party. Shipper claimed the ties should have 
been shipped under a through rate provided in the carriers 
tariff T&P No. 8500-H, applying to lumber. The railroad 
contended the tariff did not apply to cross ties and there-
fore it could not legally ~ship the ties under that tariff. It 
asked the trial court for a dismissal on the grounds the 
court did not have jurisdiction inasmuch as the sole issue 
was the construction of the tariff and the Interstate Com-
merce Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
that issue. The motion was denied, and on appeal assigned 
as error. 
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In reversing, the Supreme Court stated at page 146: 
"* * * It is not disputable that the pivotal 
question in the case was whether oak railway cross-
ties were included in the filed tariff * * * and 
so far as the solution of that inquiry depended upon 
the views of men engaged in the lumber and railroad 
business * * * it is equally indisputable that 
there was an irreconcilable conflict. And this con-
flict at once leads to a consideration of the princi pie 
which dominates the controversy and upon which its 
decison therefore depends. 
"* * * it is * * * clear that the con-
troversy as to whether the lumber tariff included 
crossties was one primarily to be determined by the 
Commission in the exercise of its power concerning 
tariffs and the authority to regulate conferred upon 
it by the statute. Indeed, we think it is indisputable 
that that subject is directly controlled by the au-
thorities which establish that for the preservation 
of the uniformity which it was the purpose of the 
Act to Regulate Commerce to secure, the courts may 
not as an original question exert authority over sub-
jects which primarily come with (in) the jurisdic-
tion of the Commission. (Citing cases.) 
"The foundation upon which the doctrine rests 
* * * is the necessity of a uniform enforcement 
of the Interstate Commerce Act and the danger of 
diversity and conflict arising if questions concern-
ing the existence of tariffs or their reasonableness, 
of discriminations and preferences were left to be 
originally determined by courts of general j urisdic-
tion, thus giving rise to the possibility of one rule 
in one jurisdiction and another in another * * * ." 
"The effect of the holding is clear: The courts 
must not only refrain from making tariffs, but, 
under certain circumstances, must decline to con-
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strue them as well." United States v. Western Pac. 
R. Co., supra, at 65. 
In Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 
supra, at 293, Justice Brandeis analyzes the Tie case. He 
points out that it was a dispute as to whether the word 
"lumber" was used in its ordinary meaning or in a peculiar 
meaning, and therefore the question was not one of legal 
construction but of fact, upon which there was "irrecon-
cilable conflict" among "the views of men engaged in the 
lumber and railroad business." Brandeis concluded that 
referral of the question of fact to the Commission was nec-
essary "to ensure uniformity." 
Part of the dispute in this case is whether the words 
of the transit tariff are used in their ordinary meaning or 
in a peculiar meaning. The filing of the lawsuits and the 
objections to referral by the shipper alone show that the 
views of men engaged in the fabrication-in-transit and rail-
road business are in "irreconcilable conflict." Under such 
circumstances extrinsic evidence will be necessary to de-
termine whether peculiar or extraordinary meanings are 
used, and construction of the transit tariff must therefore, 
"to ensure uniformity," be referred to the Commission. 
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 
supra, is a landmark decision on the question of interstate 
tariff construction. The holding was adhered to by the 
Supreme Court in the Western Pacific case, where it was 
described as a "particularization" of the circumstances in 
the Tie case. 
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There a shipper commenced action in a state court to 
recover charges exacted by the carrier under a reconsign-
ment or diversion tariff. Plaintiff had shipped corn to 
Willmar, Minnesota, for inspection, and then rebilled the 
shipments to Anoka, a station beyond. Naming Willmar in 
the bills of lading as destination point was to facilitate 
inspection of the ladings as required by law. After inspec-
tion, disposition orders were given and the original bills of 
lading exchanged for billing to Anoka. For this exchange 
the railroad added a charge of $5 per car pursuant to Rule 
10 of its tariff. The rule provided that "if a car is diverted, 
reconsigned or reforwarded 
* car at original destination, 
car will be made * * *" 
* * 
* * 
* after arrival of the 
a charge of $5.00 per 
The shipper claimed to be 
within an exception to Rule 10, which provided that it would 
not apply to "grain * * * carloads, held in cars on 
track for inspection and disposition orders incident thereto 
at billed destination or at point intermediate thereto." The 
issue was to determine whether Rule 10 or the exception 
applied, a question solely of construction. Over the carrier's 
objection the trial court construed the exception to mean 
that cars were exempt if held on the track at billed desti-
nation for inspection and for "disposition orders" incident 
thereto. It held that the disposition order could be a recon-
signment to another destination and forwarding to Anoka 
was such a disposition. 
The Supreme Court, in affirming the state court, held 
that under the facts of this case the issue of tariff construc-
tion could be decided by the court and it did not have to 
be referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission because 
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there was no dispute concerning the facts and the words 
of the tariff were used in "their ordinary meaning." Thus 
the construction presented a question "solely of law" and, 
like the construction of any other legal document in dispute, 
was a proper question for the court. 
"Here no fact, evidential or ultimate, is in con-
troversy; and there is no occasion for the exercise 
of administrative discretion. The task to be per-
formed is to determine the meaning of words of the 
tariff which were used in their ordinary sense and 
to apply that meaning to the undisputed facts. That 
question was solely one of construction; and pre-
liminary resort to the Commission was, therefore, 
unnecessary." ld., 294. 
Deciding the issue of whether "disposition order" meant 
a "reconsignment" in the Great Northern case required only 
three readily available sources of information: first, the 
tariff ; second, the dictionary ; and third, the abstract rules 
of legal construction.* 
Brandeis then considers the problem where the issue 
is more than one "solely of law" and at page 291, states: 
"* * * But words are used sometimes in a 
peculiar meaning. Then extrinsic evidence may be 
necessary to determine the meaning of words ap-
pearing in the document. This is true where tech-
nical words or phrases not commonly understood 
are employed. Or extrinsic evidence may be neces-
sary to establish a usage of trade or locality which 
attaches provisions not expressed. in the language 
*Another example is the Utah case of TV estern Pac. R. Co. v. Wasatch 
Chemical Co., 117 Utah 411, 217 P. 2d 371 (1950), where the court 
determines the 1neaning of words by merely referring to Webster. In 
addition, the question of primary jurisdiction was never considered. 
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of the instrument. Where such a situation arises, 
and the peculiar meaning of words, or the existence 
of a usage, is proved by evidence, the function of 
construction is necessarily preceded by the deter-
mination of the matter of fact. * * * where 
the document to be construed is a tariff of an inter-
state carrier, and before it can be construed it is 
necessary to determine upon evidence the peculiar 
meaning of words or the existence of incidents al-
leged to be attached by usage to the transaction, the 
preliminary determination must be made by the 
Commission; and not until this determination has 
been made, can a court take juris diction of the con-
troversy. If this were not so, that uniformity which 
it is the purpose of the Commerce Act to secure could 
not be attained. * * *" 
It is difficult to imagine issues so ripe for reference 
as the ones before us. U. P. Tariff 7188-P is replete with 
"technical words or phrases not commonly understood." 
Only a casual reading of the applicable Items of the tariff 
is necessary to forcefully illustrate the complexity and tech-
nicality of the document. For these rna tters extrinsic evi-
dence for proper determination is indispensable to insure 
the uniformity "which it is the purpose of the Commerce 
Act to secure." 
Appellant states that "Brandeis rather effectively does 
away with the uniformity argument" (App. Br. 14) by his 
language appearing in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' 
Elevator Co., at 290, as follows: 
"This argument [for uniformity] is unsound. 
It is true that uniformity is the paramount purpose 
of the Commerce Act. But it is not true that uni-
formity in construction of a tariff can be attained 
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only through a preliminary resort to the Commis-
sion to settle the construction in dispute. Every 
question of the construction of a tariff is deemed 
a question of law; and where the question concerns 
an interstate tariff it is one of federal law. If the 
parties properly preserve their rights, a construction 
given by any court, whether it be federal or state, 
may ultimately be reviewed by this court either on 
writ of error or on writ of certiorari; and thereby 
uniformity in construction may be secured. Hence, 
the attainment of uniformity does not require that 
in every case where the construction of a tariff is 
in dispute, there shall be a preliminary resort to the 
Commission." (Emphasis added.) 
An examination of the case reveals that this language 
is only applicable to questions solely of law, because uni-
formity may be secured through Supreme Court review. 
However, where facts must be found and specialized judg-
ment is necessary, the unifying influence of that Court can-
not be reached and therefore preliminary referral to the 
Commission is necessary to insure proper uniformity. See 
Davis, supra, at 666. 
In United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra, the 
United States shipped a number of carloads of steel aerial 
bomb cases filled with napalm gel, which is gasoline thick-
ened by the addition of aluminum soap powder. The car-
riers involved, billed the government at the first-class rate 
established in Item 1820 of Consolidated Freight Classifi-
cation No. 17 for "incendiary bombs." The Government 
contended that since the commodity did not include the 
burster and fuse and thus 'vas not a completed bomb, the 
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shipments should be carried at the fifth-class rate applic-
able to gasoline in steel drums. 
Action was originally commenced in the Court of 
Claims under the Tucker Act, where the court entered sum-
mary judgment for the carriers upon determining that the 
shipments in question were "incendiary bombs." 
Although the parties had not raised the issue of tariff 
construction, the court inquired into that aspect of the 
decision and "concluded that in the circumstances * * * 
presented the question of tariff construction, as well as 
that of the reasonableness of the tariff as applied, was 
within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission." I d., at 63. 
The determination that the Commission should first 
pass upon the construction of the disputed tariff, was based 
upon "whether the question raises issues of transportation 
policy which ought to be considered by the Commission in 
the interests of a uniform and expert administration of the 
regulatory scheme laid down by that Act." I d., at 65. 
The court turned for its answer to that question to the 
holdings of the Tie and Great Northern cases : 
"* * * Where the question is simply one of 
construction, the courts may pass on it as an issue 
'solely of law.' But where words in a tariff are 
used in a peculiar or technical sense, and where 
extrinsic evidence is necessary to determine their 
meaning or proper application, so that 'the inquiry 
is essentially one of fact and of discretion in techni-
cal matters,' then the issue of tariff application must 
first go to the Commission. The reason is plainly set 
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forth: Such a 'determination is reached ordinarily 
upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the 
adequate appreciation of which acquaintance with 
many intricate facts of transportation is indispens-
able ; and such acquaintance is commonly to be found 
only in a body of experts.' * * * We must 
therefore decide whether a determination of the 
meaning of the term 'incendiary bomb' in Item 1820 
involves factors 'the adequate appreciation of which' 
presupposes an 'acquaintance with many intricate 
facts of transportation.' We conclude that it does." 
Id., at 66. 
There were actually two matters which were initially 
for the Commission's determination: first, the issue of 
tariff construction and, second, the issue of the reasonable-
ness of the tariff as applied. The court reasoned that both 
the technical meaning of the phrase "incendiary bomb," 
and the reasonableness of the rate were dependent upon 
the same extrinsic background factors and were therefore 
so intertwined that a single investigation into the same 
factors was determinative of both issues. Thus, "complex 
and technical cost allocation" had to be considered not only 
in determining the rate, but also in determining the mean-
ing of "incendiary bomb," to which the rate would apply. 
"In other words, there were obviously commer-
cial reasons why a higher tariff was set for incen-
diary bombs than for, say, lumber. It therefore fol-
lows that the decision whether a certain item was 
intended to be covered by the tariff for incendiary 
bombs [a question of construction] involves an inti-
mate knowledge of these very reasons themselves. 
Whether steel casings filled zuith napalm gel are in-
cendiary bombs is, in this context, more than simply 
a question of reading the tariff language o1· apply-
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ing abstract 'rules' of construction. For the basic 
issue is how far the reasons justifying a high rate 
for the carriage of extra-hazardous objects were 
applicable to the instant shipment. Do the factors 
which make for high costs and therefore high rates 
on incendiary bombs also call for a high rate on steel 
casings filled with napalm gel? To answer that 
question there must be close familiarity with these 
factors. Such familiarity is possessed not by the 
courts but by the agency which had the exclusive 
power to pass on the rate in the first instance. And, 
on the other hand, to decide the question of the scope 
of this tariff without consideration of the factors 
and purposes underlying the terminology employed 
would make the process of adjudication little more 
than an exe?'"cise in semantics." ld., at 66, 67. (Em-
phasis added.) 
The court aptly concludes: 
"* * * For the court here to undertake to 
fix the limits of the tariff's application * * * 
is tantamount to engaging in judicial guesswork." 
ld., at 68. 
There being no question that the determination of the 
reasonableness of a tariff is always within the exclusive 
primary jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, the basic precedent established in the Western Pacific 
case is in the field of tariff construction. The opinion itself 
cites only those cases dealing with that issue, and the analy-
sis of the court is based wholly thereon. 
The issues in the cases presently before the Court are 
as properly referable to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion as was the issue in the Western Pacific case. The 
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terminology of the tariff is highly technical and numerous 
words and phrases are in dispute. For example, in Item 
100, there is dispute over the meaning of "identity," "the 
integrity of the through rate" and "substitution of struc-
tural iron or steel"; in Item 5, there is a dispute over "re-
working or fabricating"; in Item 125, of "transit material 
and unfabricated articles." This is only a partial list in 
the overall disagreement as to the proper construction of 
the tariff. 
In these cases the reasons for the existence of the 
doctrine are readily apparent, and the purposes it serves 
will be aided by its application. !i)~.bri~tion_ in_ .tDtusi.l~ 
sk~1 P~Q!liJ.~t~~ i§-=~n _ irn~buslne~~§ ~an.UJJigbJ~ ... ~om-
petitiy~-~- < ••• Th~!~fo~e qn.Jfgrro __ _t;r~~tm~:nt ___ Qf _,._~~-c_s}lippers._. 
throg_g}!o_~t JJJ._~ _ countrY. _r~qutr~.s a uJl!f.()rm )pte:rpr~!~t~2n 
of all fabricati.Qnd.U::.transit_J.ar~..a.llow ~the~ effect 
g~ v~B---~~ cllJar!.!!~---jg ___ }?_~ _. l;>~~~g~"Jl~Qn __ Y!!:riaJ~l.~ .. tind._ing&~~Jl! 
fact by courts, would_ defeat Jhe uniforill.i.tJk_ sought .. hy:.ihe 
Inter!?_t_~~~--- 9o~merce _ A_~t. _Therefore su~lL. lJ;I].i~9rmity __ can 
only .. !? .. e_. q__~c._Qml)Jlah.e.d_b~L-~eferring.. suc.h.jssues~~to the -Com-
missiqp._. In a_qqitJo.!! t2~P~<2.~~!!~- !-IE.~~J;~!~EE-~~8~-:r~~ ~.9~---· . 
plex and tec.~,I,l~c~!-~9-.()~UP.en~--( ev~:n- app~_l!~nt ~o;t1c~g~~ttll~ 
tariff is complex (App. Br. 23), there is need J9r the ~ssist-
ance or t_h9_~~ _h..~Y.!P.-K .. '-~!!.!t ~cqu~_intapce witb many int;rjca,te 
facts of transnortatiQJL.iO.~&..UPllly_their specialized._ compe-
tell:<;~ .. ~ll9: -.~)fpertn~~§~ .. ';I.]1u§ _the _cqns~ruG_t~Q!t_oi _ thJ~Lt~_:rj"ft 
rais.~~ ql!:~~~91?-§~,_:w,:pJc~ __ LQ!!gJ~.t J._q__p~-~9.ll~Jd .. ~red by the Com-
mjs~!.Q_P-:_. i!.:l:.1h~ .. trtte.r~st§_gf.. ~-_"uniform .and expert adminis-
trati9n _Qf .. t.hf3. r.~S".t1~atory_ scheme laid down by t:h~.-~~t." 
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Returning to the Brandeis test: Could this transit 
Lriff be properly construed by simply referring to the 
Lriff, the English language and the general abstract rules 
[ legal construction? We cannot see how. Although a tar-
:f is made up of words intending to convey some basic 
lnclusion or conclusions, it is not, as Justice Harlan states 
1 the Western Pacific case, "an abstraction." Extrinsic 
~idence is necessary to establish the following facts: the 
roper meaning of the technical terminology, to determine 
rhat factors were considered in drafting and publishing 
.1e tariff, to examine its basic purpose and to determine 
.1e Commission's reasons for granting the tariff privilege 
1itially. Only with this background in mind can it be fairly 
etermined to what extent the fabricator is required or not 
equired to work the article, the extent to which he may or 
1ay not make substitutions of inbound and outbound arti-
les, his rights to store the articles listed in Item 5 and 
rhether he may wrap pipe fabricated from steel sheets at 
h.e transit point. To construe the tariff without making 
uch findings "is tantamount to engaging in judicial guess-
rork." United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra, 68. 
See also: New York, Susquehanna & Western R. Co . 
. Follmer, 254 F. 2d 510 (C. C. A.-3, 1958) ; United States 
. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., supra; United States v. Chesa-
~eake & 0. R. Co., 242 F. 2d 732 (C. C. A.-4, 1957) ; lnter-
,ational Pacific Co. v. Delaware & H. R. Corp., 73 F. Supp. 
0 (N.D., N.Y., 1938) ; Director General (of Railroads) v. 
"'iscoe Co., 254 U. S. 498, at 504, 41 S. Ct. 151, 65 L. Ed. 
72 (1921) ; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 
upra; United States v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 
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supra; Norge Corp. v. Long Island R. Co., 77 F. 2d 312 (C. 
C. A.-2, 1935) ; Porto Transportation, Inc., v. Consolidated 
Diesel Electric Corp., 20 F. R. D. 1 (S. D., N. Y., 1956); 
Armour & Co. v. Chicago M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 188 F. 2d 
603 (C. C. A.-7, 1951) ; Schwartzman v. United Air Lines 
Trans. Corp., 6 F. R. D. 517 (D., Neb., 1947) ; 15 C. J. S., 
Commerce, Sec. 143. 
Appellant is concerned with the effect the Utah Court 
may give to a determination of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission of the five issues of tariff construction listed 
in the order of referral (App. Br. 7, 8). Since the trial court 
has not yet given any effect to an Interstate Commerce Com-
mission determination, the matter is premature and is not 
before the court on this appeal. However, if appellant is 
merely seeking information as to respondent's position on 
this matter, we are happy to oblige. 
There is really no "mischief" in the order of referral. 
Its form is designed to present the issues to the Commission 
in the proper legal manner. It is a request by the state court 
for a determination of certain questions. This will involve 
a "report * * * on the issues of tariff interpretation 
and issues of fact" (R. 43). Upon referral to the Commis-
sion the introduction of extrinsic evidence and findings 
will be necessary before the interpretation of the tariff 
itself may be accomplished. Thus both findings of fact and 
conclusions of law would be returned to the trial court. 
We cannot say what effect the trial court would give 
to such findings and conclusions. Precedent should control 
such effect. However, findings . .l;>Y ,t)l~ Cgmmi~~~QA~~Jlll; 
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I!Qrted by substantial evidence, are binding on . ..11.1~ court. 
Hudson & Manhattan R. Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 98, 
·' 
61 S. Ct. 884, 85 L. Ed. 1212 (1941) ; Interstate Commerce 
Commf~sion v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 1129, 
88 L. Ed. 1420 (1944); Crancer v. Lowden, 315 U. S. 631, 
62 S. Ct. 763, 86 L. Ed. 1077 (1942); Chicago, M. St. P. & 
P. R. Co. v. Allouette Peat Products, 253 F. 2d 449 (C. C. 
"" A.-9, 1957). Conclusiol}~ .9( law, on.~_the ot:her ha:nd, al-
tho_ygh_ entitled .. to respectful ~consideration by_ the court, 
do not _]HJ.Ve the .. same finality as .. finding~ of fact, and the 
court is not_]Jou.~_<J thereby. Brown Lumber Co. v. L. & N. 
R. Co., 299 U. S. 393, 57 S. Ct. 265, 81 L. Ed. 301 (1937) ; 
Levinson v. Spector Motor Co., 330 U. S. 649, 672, 67 S. Ct. 
931, 91 L. Ed. 1158 ( 194 7) ; Chicago M. & St. P. & P. R. 
Co. v. Allouette Peat Products, supra; Union Pacific Rail-
road Co. v. Corneli Seed Co., 161 F. Supp. 52, (D., Idaho, 
1958). 
B. Suspension of the judicial process and reten-
tion of jurisdiction by the district court for 
all purposes was proper since, upon return, 
the court must determine all remaining issues 
of fact and law, a ward damages, if proper, 
and enforce judgments, if any. 
Retention of jurisdiction by the state court rather than 
dismissal of the proceeding depends upon whether any 
"purpose will * * * be served to hold the * * * 
action in abeyance in the District Court * * * ." F(Jjf' 
East Conference v. United States, supra, at 577. If the only 
issue is entirely within the scope of the agency's dominion, 
the matter should be dismissed; however, if there are certain 
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issues within the overall suit which are within the power of 
the court to adjudicate, or where the dismissal may affect 
a remedy upon which the cause of action is based, a stay 
is proper. General American Tank Car Corp. v. ElDorado 
Terminal Co., supra, at 433; United States v. Western Pac. 
R. Co., supra, at 64; United States v. Kansas City Southern 
Ry. Co., supra, at 769. 
In the cases before us there are issues within the gen-
eral jurisdiction of the state court, such as, when and where 
each carload was shipped and when each arrived at point of 
destination. There is an issue in each cause of action as to 
whether or not the Statute of Limitations has ·run on the 
carrier's claim. There is the matter of awarding and 
enforcing judgments in favor of respondent, if proper. 
Under these circumstances a "purpose will be served" in 
holding the actions in abeyance, and the trial court properly 
did so. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court committed no error In referring 
the five questions of tariff construction to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. Its action should be affirmed on 
this interlocutory appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
SCOTT M. MATHESON, JR., 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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APPENDIX 
Items 5, 60, 65, 80, 100, 110, 120 and 125 
of U. P. R. R. Tariff No. 7188-P, with supplements 
Item No.5 
(Effective May 15, 1952) 
FABRICATION AND TREATING OF 
STRUCTURAL IRON OR STEEL AND OTHER 
COMMODITIES IN TRANSIT. 
APPLICATION 
CarJoad §h!r>m~nts of .!rP.n.Pr.,~t~~l, viz.: 
Angles, Bars, Beams, Channels, Columns, Cul-
verts, set-up or knocked down, Ells, Girders, Masts, 
Plates, Rods (Except Coiled Rods), Sheets, Tees, 
and Zees, Tubular Iron or Steel (See Exception 1), 
castings (when shipped in the rough not fitted, 
painted, Japanned, bronzed, coppered, acid coppered, 
plated, tinned or galvanized), Iron or Steel Articles 
to be converted into Iron or Steel Roofing or Siding, 
Iron or Steel Ceiling, and Iron or Steel Shingles, and 
other Iron and Steel Articles, may_ b~ _stopped in 
tra.nsi t . .a.t . .§t.a.tiQU.S . _on ~.tb~~---1J nion . f~-~_jfjc Railr_q~q, 
viz.: . (J) _S.t~:tJQ.nsNos. 2390 Ogden, Utah and 5560 
Salt __ .. ~~~e .. City:, Utah to . 9580 Huntington, _Ore., 
16670 Ironton, Utah, to 16715 Cutler, Utah, and 
1678_Q_J.\lQunt, Utah, to 16807, Officer,. Utah, inclu-
sive. wh~:P. .suclt.stations a:re ,.<;li;r~_ctly .. inte:rme<i.i~t~ 
between point of origin a_ud finaL destination, for 
the purpose .Qf ~r~w<;n;~,i.:Q.g __ Q:r _fapri.c~t~ng,_ subject to 
the rules and conditions published in Items 10 to 130, 
inclusive, as follows: 
Provisions of this item will not apply where the 
transit point and destination are both within the 
same switching limits. 
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Iron or steel pipe, fabricated from iron or steel 
plate or sheet, standard gauge No. 16 or thicker, 
may be coated with or dipped in asphalt or a com-
pound having tar or asphalt base, only at the fabri-
cating point. The weight of the asphalt or compound 
applied to the pipe at the fabricating point to be 
treated as non-transit material and subject to the 
existing rules governing non-transit material as pro-
vided in the fabricating in transit tariffs (See Ex-
ceptions 2 and 3) . 
* * * 
EXCEPTION !-Threading or rethreading in 
transit of Iron or Steel Pipe or Tubular Iron or Tub-
ular Steel will not be permitted under the provisions 
of this tariff. 
EXCEPTION 2-Iron or Steel Pipe moving 
under rates named in Pacific Southcoast Freight 
Bureau Tariff No. 260-B, Agent J. P. Haynes, I. C. 
C. No. 1552, from points taking Groups 2, 2-A or 4 
rates may be stopped at Salt Lake City, Utah, for 
privilege of dipping or wrapping. The weight of 
the asphalt andjor other materials applied to the 
pipe at transit point to be treated as non-transit 
material. 
EXCEPTION 3-Iron or Steel Pipe moving 
under rates named in Pacific Southcoast Freight 
Bureau Tariff No. 2-K, Agent J. P. Haynes, I. C. C .. 
No. 1362, from points taking Group 5, 5-A, 5-B or 
5-C rates, may be stopped at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for dipping or wrapping. The weight of the asphalt 
andjor other materials applied to the pipe at transit 
point shall be treated as non-transit material. 
EXCEPTION 4-Effective December 30, 1953. 
Carload shipments of Iron or Steel Pipe may be 
stopped in transit at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
U. P. R. R. intermediate (see also Items 15 to 50 
inclusive) between point of origin and point of des-
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tination for the purpose of dipping or wrapping at 
a transit charge of 31/2 cents per 100 pounds. The 
weight of asphalt or compound, also the wrapping 
applied to the pipe at Salt Lake City, Utah to be 
treated as non-transit material as provided in Item 
125. ( 98-580-2.) 
Item No. 60 
(Effective May 15, 1952) 
TRANSIT CHARGE 
On shipments accorded transit privileges under 
this tariff, an additional charge of 31~ cents per 
100 lbs., will be made for the transit privilege, this 
charge to be assessed on the actual outbound weight 
of the transit portion of the shipment, or on the 
minimum carload weight applicable to the transit 
portion of the shipment, whichever is higher. 
Item No. 65 
(Effective May 15, 1952) 
PROTECTION OF THROUGH RATE 
Except as provided in Note 1, the through rate 
to be applied is that in effect on the outbound tran-
sited article on the date shipment left point of origin 
from point of origin to the transit destination or 
from the point of origin to the transit station or 
from the transit station to the transit destination, 
whichever is highest, plus transit charge as per Item 
60, except that where the rate from point of origin 
to transit destination, on the inbound material to 
transit point, in effect on date shipment left point 
of origin, is higher than any of the above rates such 
rate will apply, plus transit charge as per Item 60. 
In no case will the total charge exceed the com-
bination of tariff rates to and from transit station. 
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The minimum carload weight to be used is that 
governing the through rate applied. 
NOTE 1-0n export shipments rate to apply 
will be the through rate on the finished product from 
point of origin to port of export, in effect on date 
shipment leaves point of origin, plus transit charge 
of 314 cents per 100 pounds. 
Item No. 80 
(Effective May 15, 1952) 
RESHIPMENT FROM PROPER WAREHOUSE 
These rules will apply only when the commodi-
ties are reshipped from the warehouse, storeroom or 
manufacturing plant into which they were originally 
unloaded, except in the case of the actual transfer 
of the commodity, in which case the seller must 
certify on the back of the tonnage credit slip that 
the commodity was actually transferred, giving the 
date and method of transfer. 
Item No. 100 
(Effective May 15, 1952) 
PRESERVING IDENTITY OF IRON AND STEEL 
The identity of structural iron or steel, as de-
fined in Item 5, unloaded in a warehouse, storeroom 
or at a manufacturing plant, cannot be preserved, 
and the integrity of the through rate being preserved 
by the requirements as to the surrender of inbound 
tonnage credit slips, verification of records or re-
ceipts and shipments by authorized representatives 
of the railroad, substitution of structural iron or 
steel as defined in Item 5, originating on one line, 
for a like commodity originating on other lines, will 
be permitted. 
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Item No. 110 
(Effective May 15, 1952) 
SUBSTITUTION OF INBOUND FREIGHT BILLS 
AND TONNAGE CREDIT SLIPS 
At time billing instructions are given for ship-
ment from transit station, unexpired inbound bill-
ing shall be surrendered to the carriers' agent. When 
such billing is not surrendered, flat rate from tran-
sit station will apply. 
To correct errors due to surrender of non-ap-
plicable freight bills or tonnage credit slips, proper 
freight bills or tonnage credit slips may be exchanged 
for those surrendered. 
No readjustment may be made in cases where 
the freight bills or tonnage credit slips originally 
surrendered were applicable or where there was no 
surrender of billing. 
Non-applicable freight bills or tonnage credit 
slips are those, the surrender of which does not re-
sult in the shipper securing the benefit of a lower 
rate than the flat rate from transit point to final 
destination. 
Item No. 120 
(Effective May 15, 1952) 
TRANSFER OF TONNAGE OR OWNERSHIP 
Freight bills on commodities to be accorded 
transit privileges may be transfered when tonnage 
represented thereby is sold, or sold and transferred 
from one transit house to another at the transit sta-
tion, or transferred at the transit station from one 
transit house to another transit house of the same 
ownership. In connection with tonnage which has 
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been sold or transferred, one of the following forms 
of assignment must be endorsed on each freight bill: 
(a) The tonnage represented by this freight 
bill has been sold to 
__________________ and the transit privileges there-
of, if any, transferred to ________________ _ 
~igned ___________________________________________________ ___ 
(b) The tonnage represented by this freight 
bill has been transferred to ____ _ 
______________________________ and the transit privi-
leges thereof, if any, transferred to __ 
Signed ____ _ 
Any additional switching charges performed at 
transit station must be charged for in accordance 
with tariffs, lawfully on file with the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. 
Item No. 125 
(Effective May 15, 1952) 
MIXED SHIPMENTS OF PART TRANSIT AND 
PART NON-TRANSIT ARTICLE~ 
When outbound shipments consist of a mixture 
of transit material and non-transit material in the 
same car, charges will be assessed as follows: 
(a) On the transit material, at rates indicated 
in Item 55. 
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(b) On the non-transit material, at the car-
load rate on the non-transit material, re-
shipped from fabrication point to final 
destination (see Note). 
The entire carload will be subject to the~ high-
est carload minimum weight of any kind of fabri-
cated material contained in the car (actual weight, 
if in excess thereof). Any deficiency in minimum 
weight will be added to the non-transit portion, un-
less shipper surrenders freight bill to cover the defi-
cit in the carload minimum weight, in which event 
the deficit will be treated as transit tonnage and 
charges assessed accordingly. The weight of the 
non-transit portion may be used in making up car-
load minimum weight. 
The term transit material referred to in this 
Item is understood to include unfabricated articles 
enumerated in Item 5. 
The term non-transit material referred to in 
this I tern is understood to cover all other Iron or 
Steel articles other than those enumerated in Item 
5, also accessories and appurtenances necessary to 
complete the finished article. 
NOTE-On a shipment to a destination located 
in the same state as the transit station, the flat car-
load rate or rates from the transit station on the non-
transit portion andjor commodities not entitled to 
transit, will be the interstate flat rate or rates from 
the transit station to destination, when any or all of 
the inbound billing surrendered represents tonnage 
originating at points outside of the state in which 
the transit station is located. 
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